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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
plicate the already impossible task of lawyers and judges involved in
antitrust litigation. It is regrettable that the Court picked such a complex
vehicle as Zenith, which could have been decided on the issue of waiver
alone,26 to continue its policy of protection of the private plaintiff.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Bankruptcy-Wage Earner's Vacation Pay Held Not to Be Property
Under Section 70a(5)
In Lines v. Frederick,1 the Supreme Court has held that the accrued
vacation pay of two bankrupt wage earners does not pass to a trustee in
bankruptcy as "property" under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.2
The referee in each case had ordered the wage earner to turn over his
vacation pay to the trustee on receipt, less an amount exempt under
applicable California law.' On appeal the district court affirmed, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, maintaining that the accrued
vacation pay was not "property" within the coverage of section 70a(5) .
" See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. 91 S. Ct. at 811.
1400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam).
Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1964), provides:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt... shall in turn be vested by opera-
tion of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition... except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt,
to all the following kinds of property wherever located... (5) property, in-
cluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him . . . . Provided, That rights of
action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt...
shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights
of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration,
or other judicial process ....
'CAL. Cry. PRO. CODE § 690.11 (West 1955) provided that the following shall
be exempt from the claims of creditors:
One-half of the earnings of the defendant or judgment debtor received for
his personal services within 30 days next preceding the levy of attachment or
execution where such one-half is necessary for the use of the debtor, or his
family supported in whole or in part by such debtor.
This California statute was repealed in 1970 by Ch. 1323, § 27, [1970] CAL. STATS.
-, but substantially the same provision can be found in CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 690.6 (West Supp. 1971). Accordingly, under California law creditors could
reach all but a small portion of the accrued vacation pay in Lines. This would
suffice to pass the nonexempt portion under section 70a(5), assuming that vaca-
tion pay would be considered "property."
400 U.S. at 18. Earlier the fifth circuit had reached an opposite conclusion
in Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
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In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is "to give the debtor a 'new oppor-
tunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,' "I and that this basic
purpose circumscribes any judicial definition of property under section
70a(5).' The Court reasoned that since vacation pay is a part of workers'
weekly earnings, and functions "to support the basic requirements of life
for them and their families during brief vacation periods or in the event
of layoff," it is essential to bankrupt wage earners in making a "fresh
start" and should not pass to the trustee.
7
Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act enumerates different kinds of in-
terests which automatically vest in the trustee upon the filing of the
petition, unless exempt under applicable state law. Under section 70a(5),
as pertinent here, property passes if prior to the filing of the petition it
was either transferable by the bankrupt or could have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him.' Ordinarily, federal courts
follow local statutory or decisional law "upon the question of whether
particular property is endowed with the legal attributes and incidents of
transferability or susceptibility to sale by judicial process." 9 In Lines,
however, the Court never reached the question of whether, under California
law, accrued vacation pay is transferable or leviable. Such an inquiry,
which predominates in most cases involving section 70a (5), was obviated
by the Court's determination that the vacation pay was not "property" and
hence did not vest regardless of local law concerning its transferability
or leviability.
The traditional scope of section 70a(5) was stated earlier by the
Court in Segal v. Rochelle :10
'400 U.S. at 19, quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
a 400 U.S. at 19.
7 Id. at 20.
1 See note 2 supra. The proviso in section 70a(5) states that rights of action
for certain types of personal injuries will not pass to the trustee, unless subject to
judicial process.
'Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 839 (1951). See, e.g., Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176
(1926) (state law determines whether a wife's interest in the bankrupt's prop-
erty passed to the trustee); Hewit v. Berlin Mach. Works, 194 U.S. 296 (1904)
(state law determines whether vendor's title upon a conditional sale was valid and
subject to pass to trustee) ; Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1956)
(state law controls whether a bankrupt's interest in a spendthrift trust will pass) ;
Cullom v. Kears, 8 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1925) (state law determines whether a
bankrupt's interest in an estate held by the entirety passes).
"382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
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The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of
value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he
files his petition. To this end the term "property" has been construed
most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is
novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.
Ordinarily federal courts have chosen to follow state court rulings on
various types of property interests. Where federal courts have not followed
local rulings, the reason has been that the state courts had defined
"property" too narrowly and had thereby prevented the passing of assets
intended to be within the reach of section 70(5)." As was observed by
the Court in Board of Trade v. Johnson,'2
Congress derives its power to enact a bankruptcy law from the Federal
Constitution, and the construction of it is a federal question. Of course,
where the bankruptcy law deals with property rights which are reg-
ulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will follow
the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a policy
requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state decisions
would give it, federal courts can not be concluded by them.
The Court in Lines interposes its own definition of "property" with-
out regard to state law, but it does not do so in order to secure assets for
creditors through a "broader construction of the statute." In fact, it
is the Court itself in Lines which is narrowly defining "property" so as
to prevent the passing of assets clearly alienable or leviable under state
law.'3 Thus, the Court subverts its traditional policy of sweeping all assets
of value into the bankruptcy estate to its concern for giving the debtor
a "fresh start" after bankruptcy. Indeed, a definitional approach formerly
employed by the federal courts in furtherance of one policy is being used
in Lines to serve an entirely different objective.
In Wetmore v. Markoe,'4 which appears to be the seminal case artic-
ulating the "fresh start" rationale, the Court stated that
"See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (seat on stock ex-
change passes as transferable property, notwithstanding prior state court deter-
mination that such was not "property"); Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th
Cir. 1949) (bankrupt's interest in trust passes although Illinois law provided that
creditors cannot reach a debtor's interest in trusts created by others and state court
had interpreted this law to prevent passage to the trustee).
12264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924) (emphasis added).
13See note 3 supra & note 26 infra.
a' 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (emphasis added).
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[s]ystems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to, permit
him to 'have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from
the obligation and misfortunes which may have resulted from business
responsibilities.
It was in furtherance of such a design that the Court in Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt 5 ruled that a state court could not enforce an assignment of
future wages that a bankrupt had made before declaration of bankruptcy.
There the Court said:
The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which
it is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford the emanicipated
debtor, would be of little value to the wage earner if he were obliged to
face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his
earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebted-
ness incurred prior to bankruptcy.1 6
The Court also noted that "wages earned after the adjudication became
the property of the bankrupt clear of the claims of all creditors" and that
an individual's earning capacity is not "property within the meaning of
the bankruptcy act.""lT Although it is easily seen that a wage earner in
the Local Loan Co. situation could hardly make a "fresh start" if deprived
of his earnings subsequent to discharge, to hold as the Court does in
Lines that vacation pay already accrued is not property within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act goes far beyond the "fresh start" rationale
as articulated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.
It is well-settled that compensation owed to a bankrupt for services
fully performed by the time bankruptcy is declared passes to the trustee
under section 70a(5),18 even though payment is not to be made until
after discharge. 9 In Legg v. St. John,2 ° a case arguably similar to Lines,
the Supreme Court held that the accrued right of a bankrupt to receive
disability benefits in the future under an insurance contract does pass to
the trustee. There the Court noted that
1292 U.S. 234 (1934).
1 Id. at 245. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Brown in Kolb v.
Berlin, 356 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1966).'1292 U.S. at 243.
"8 In re Hannan, 127 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d
784 (4th Cir. 1938). See generally 9 Am. Jun. 2d Bankruptcy § 912 (1963).
In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937).
.0296 U.S. 489 (1936).
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[t]he right to receive disability benefits in the future does not differ
from any other right acquired before adjudication to receive money
thereafter.... Like other property, it passed to the trustee, unless
exempted by the law of the bankrupt's domicile. The principle declared
in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt... is not applicable here.
21
This case would seem to be strong authority for the proposition that
accrued vacation pay should pass as property, since the right to the money
vests before adjudication.
In other cases involving interests similar to accrued vacation pay,
the lower federal courts have consistently arrived at conclusions different
from that reached in Lines. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that both money due for annual leave2 3 and the right to receive a lump
sum payment of a retirement fund contribution 4 are "property" passing
under section 70a(5). Moreover, there are two recent federal court
decisions in California which have concluded that accrued vacation pay
does pass. In re Kuether" held that accrued vacation pay passed to the
trustee since under California law such an interest was clearly assignable."'
The bankruptcy court in In re Cohen2 found that a bankrupt school teach-
er's right to receive summer vacation pay as part of a prorated twelve
month salary, but for which no additional services were required, was
"property" within the reach of section 70a(5). These cases and others
I Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added).
2Cf. In re Wright, 157 F. 544 (2d Cir. 1907) (bankrupt insurance agent's
right to receive renewal premiums passes even though bankrupt had to continue
present employment in order to receive the payments).
" Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
"'Hill v. Schaefer, 221 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955).
5 203 F. Supp. 223, 224 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
" The Court's conclusion that the right to receive accrued vacation pay is an
assignable interest under California law is clearly correct. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 1044
(West 1954) provides that "[p]roperty of any kind may be transferred, except
as otherwise provided by this Article." CAL. CIV. CoDE § 1045 (West 1954) adds
that "[a] mere possibility, not coupled with an interest, cannot be transferred."
The California courts have consistently held, however, that under these two sec-
tions even future wages or money to become due in the future upon the happening
of a contingency are assignable. See Baumgarten v. California Pac. Title & Trust
Co., 127 Cal. App. 649, 16 P.2d 332 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926). There can be little
doubt that had the Supreme Court in Lines considered the question, it would have
found accrued vacation pay to be assignable under California law. Note 3 supra
concludes that most of the accrued vacation pay in Lines could have been reached
by creditors. Thus the vacation pay could have passed to the trustee by satisfying
either or both of the conditions of section 70a(5).
' 276 F. Supp. 889, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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suggest that under case law prior to Lines accrued vacation pay passes as
"property" so long as it is alienable or leviable under applicable state law.
Lines can be viewed as the latest of a series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has asserted that a bankruptcy proceeding is of an
equitable nature.2 In Pepper v. Litton 9 the Court noted that
by virtue of [section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act] a bankruptcy court is a
court of equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the juris-
diction conferred [upon the court] by the Act, it applies the principles
and rules of equity jurisprudence .... [E] quitable powers have been
invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, substance will not give
way to form, technical considerations will not prevent substantial
justice from being done.
Easily seen here is the Court's implicit warning that it may look increasing-
ly to equitable principles for the solution to problems arising out of the
administration of the Bankruptcy Act.
Unfortunately, the Court at times has exercised its equitable powers
at the expense of disregarding clear statutory language in the Act. In
Bank of Marin v. England,"0 a bank had honored checks drawn by a
depositor after his declaration of bankruptcy. Despite the fact that section
70d(5) specifically invalidates any transfer made by or in behalf of the
bankrupt after filing,"1 with certain exceptions not applicable in Bank of
Marin,2 the Court ruled that the trustee was liable for the amount of the
checks. The Court concluded that payment in this instance was not a
"transfer" within the meaning of the statute because "it would be in-
equitable to hold liable a drawee" under these circumstances.33 The result
here, as noted by Justice Harlan in dissent, 4 may seem equitable but none-
theless contravenes clear statutory language.
A similar criticism can be leveled at the Court's decision in Reading
218 See Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles of Bank-
ruptcy, 43 REF. J. 109 (1969).
2o 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939).
so 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
" Bankruptcy Act § 70d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110d(5) (1964), provides:
A person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall have
the burden of proof. Except as otherwise provided ... no transfer by or
in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against
the trustee ....
" For exceptions to this rule, see Bankruptcy Act §§ 2 1g, 70d(1)-(5), 11 U.S.C.
§§44g, 110d(1)-(5) (1964).
33 385 U.S. at 103.
8"Id. at 103-11.
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Co. v. Brown,35 in which a tort claimant sued a bankrupt estate on the
basis of an injury caused by the negligence of the receiver. The Court
held that the claim was an "actual and necessary" cost of administration"
and accorded the claim first priority under section 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act.3 7 The Court noted: "The Act does not define 'actual and necessary'
nor has any case directly in point been brought to our attention. We
must, therefore, look to the general purposes of Section 64a, Chapter XI,
and the Bankruptcy Act as a whole."38 Thereupon, the Court felt free
to exercise its equitable powers in defining "actual and necessary" so as
to achieve the basic objective of "fairness to all persons having claims
against an insolvent."3 9 For the Court to regard a tort claim as an actual
and necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate taxes the language
of the statute, especially in view of the effect of according such a claim first
priority status.40
This technique of reaching what the Court considers a "fair" result
by selective definition of key words in the Bankruptcy Act provisions is
applied in Lines, as it was in Bank of Matin and Reading. One problem
surrounding the application of this technique is that it tends to make the
bankruptcy court a "place for a disregard or in effect a repealing of the
express provisions of statutory law." '41 The possibilities for a complete
judicial overhaul of the entire area of bankruptcy administration in the
name of "equity," or "fairness," or to "assure the debtor a fresh start"
would appear limitless in light of the Marin-Reading-Lines line of de-
cisions.
Also in Lines, the Court, in its determination to assure the bankrupt a
"fresh start," virtually ignored the other basic purpose of the Act of
securing all of the bankrupt's assets and dividing them among his creditors.
" 391 U.S. 473 (1968).
"Id. at 476.
Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964), provides:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to
creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of
payment, shall be (1) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of pre-
serving the estate subsequent to filing the petition ....
811391 U.S. at 476.
391d.
' In Reading, because of the limited assets of the estate in bankruptcy, the effect
of according first priority status to the tort claimant was to prevent the other cred-
itors from recovering any amount on their claims. See the dissent of Chief justice
Warren. 391 U.S. at 486-91."' Aug, supra note 28, at 112.
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There is authority suggesting that the congressional intent in passing the
Act in 1898 to afford the debtor a "fresh start" through discharge in
bankruptcy was subordinate to that of providing a procedure for the
collection and distribution of all the bankrupt's assets among his creditors.42
But, setting the historical argument aside, the Court in deciding any close
question in bankruptcy administration should always weigh the rights of
both creditor and debtor; the Lines opinion would appear to stand as a
notable example where this has not been done, to the detriment of the
creditor.
Furthermore, in allowing the bankrupt to retain his vacation pay
accrued prior to filing, the Court goes beyond its stated objective of pro-
viding the discharged debtor with a "fresh start." The point is cogently
made by the dissenting Justice Harlan when he argued that the majority
opinion in Lines in effect gives the bankrupt a head start over his
hypothetical counterpart who begins work for the first time on the day
after bankruptcy is declared.43 The Court summarily attempts to justify
this by noting that accrued vacation pay, as a part of wages, is a" 'special-
ized type of property' ,,44 within the ambit of its decision in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.45 This treatment is hardly satisfactory. In Sniadach
the Court was concerned with a state garnishment procedure whereby a
creditor could freeze all of a debtor's wages by service of a complaint
upon both employee and garnishee.46 These wages would remain frozen
until adjudication of the complaint, although the garnishee was required
under state law to pay the worker a subsistence allowance of at least
twenty-five dollars but not exceeding fifty per cent of the latter's owed
' See In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903). Judge Ray, the deciding
judge, had been a member of the House Judiciary Committee during the passage
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and had served as chairman of that committee during
the passage of the 1903 amendment. 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 18 (4th ed.
1934). Judge Ray made these comments on the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898:
The main purpose of the bankrupt law is to prevent preferences, and secure
a fair and an equitable division of the bankrupt estate among the creditors,
not to grant discharges. This end accomplished, the bankrupt is granted a
discharge from all his debts. The attainment of the first is not to be sacrificed
to the accomplishment of the last.
119 F. at 410.
" 400 U.S. at 21-22.
"Id. at 21.
"395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"Id. at 338-39. See also Note, Poverty Law-Garnishment-Protection of
Debtors' Rights, 48 N.C.L. REv. 164 (1969).
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wages.4 7 The effect of this procedure was to deprive the employee of at
least half of his earnings before he was given an opportunity to be heard.48
Emphasizing the severe hardship imposed upon wage earners by such
prejudgment garnishment and noting the special nature of wages,40 the
Court struck down the state procedure as violative of due process."0 It is
apparent in Sniadach that the procedure there could indeed "drive a wage-
earning family to the wall." 51 But there is certainly less hardship im-
posed upon the wage earner in the position of the bankrupt in Lines who
is being deprived only of his accrued vacation pay representing a small
fraction of his wages. The Court, however, makes no attempt to dis-
tinguish the compelling considerations that prompted its decision in
Sniadach from those in Lines.5"
In effect, the Court in Lines has subjected the Bankruptcy Act to the
Court's own conception of a national exemption policy with regard to
accrued vacation pay, thereby superseding applicable state exemption laws.
Moreover, by implication, no form of accrued wages would pass under
section 70a(5). This significantly overturns a long-established judicial
policy in conjunction with section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act"3 of leaving
- Ch. 507, § 1, [1965] Wis. Sess. L. -. This statute is former Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 267.18(2) (a), which was repealed and recreated by Ch. 127, § 10, [1969] Wis.
Sess. L. -. This new statute is codified as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18(2) (a)
(Supp. 1970-71).
" 395 U.S. at 3,39.
"Id. at 340.
"O Id. at 342.
r" Id. at 341-42.
"The Court in Lines observed that "[w]here the minimal requirements for
the economic survival of the debtor are at stake, legislatures have recognized that
protection which may be unnecessary or unwise for other kinds of property may be
required." 400 U.S. at 20. The Court cites the Consumer Credit Protection Act
§ 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970), as an example of such legislative recognition. 400
U.S. at 20. Section 1673 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act restricts the
garnishment of any disposable earnings of a wage-earner to the lesser amount of
twenty-five per cent of his weekly earnings or thirty times the minimum hourly
wage. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 303, 11 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970). Arguably
these restrictions on garnishment would operate to exempt from passage to the
trustee a large portion not only of a bankrupt's future wages, but also of any accrued
wages, including vacation pay. See Comment, Title to Property-Employee Bank-
rupt Vacation Pay, 45 Am. BAN R. L.J. 115, 119 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Am. BAlxRn. L.J.]. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, however, to suggest that Congress intended the restrictions
in section 1673 to extend beyond the creditor's remedy of garnishment.
" Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. 24 (1964), provides: "This title shall not
affect the allowance to the Bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by
the laws of the United States or by the State laws ...."
[Vol. 49
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the matter of exemptions exclusively to the states." The prospect of the
Court, and not the Congress, fashioning a "national, uniform exemption
policy by placing limitations on the meaning of the word 'property' as
used in section 70a(5) of the Act" 5 on a piecemeal basis is hardly ap-
pealing. Unfortunately, however, such a prospect would appear likely in
the wake of the Lines decision.
E. CADER HOWARD
Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Federal Courts
In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,1 a federal
court was recently called upon to decide whether to apply the state or fed-
eral rule on enforcement of foreign judgments. The court had jurisdiction
by reason of international diversity,2 held that the choice of law was
governed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 and applied the state rule.
This note will explore the issue of whether Erie should be controlling with
respect to enforcement of foreign judgments when the court has juris-
diction by reason of international, as opposed to intra-national, diversity
of citizenship.
The Somportex case has a rather complex background. Somportex
originally brought suit against Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation
for an alleged breach of contract. The suit was brought in England, and
the defendant was served at its offices in Pennsylvania. The defendant
made a conditional appearance in the English court and sought an order
"Am. BANxR. L.J. 117. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958) ;
Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Dixon v. Koplar, 102 F.2d 295
(8th Cir. 1939). In the last case it was observed that
the rights of a bankrupt to property as exempt are those given him by the
state statutes; and the federal courts, sitting as courts in bankruptcy, will
determine exemptions according to those statutes, and the decisions of the
courts of last resort of the states construing and applying those statutes.
Id. at 297.
" Am. BANXa. L.J. 117.
318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions .. .
between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). The first clause
provides for intra-national diversity jurisdiction, and the second for international
diversity jurisdiction.
'304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Court held that in a diversity case a federal
court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it is sitting.
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